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Non Technical Summary
In this paper, the relationship between regulatory and institutional set-ups and
distributive impacts in European schemes of social assistance is investigated. To
start with, several hypotheses dealing with possible causes of differences in
distributive effectiveness and efficiency are presented. We identify two groups
of arguments that deal with the relationship of distributive impacts to the
regulatory arrangements and the degree of centralisation of social assistance
schemes. By means of cluster analyses two systems of classification of
European schemes of social assistance are introduced, reflecting the systems’
differences and similarities with regard to regulatory arrangements and degrees
of centralisation, respectively. Subsequently, an empirical analysis of the
distributive effectiveness and efficiency of five selected European social
assistance schemes is carried out. 
The results suggest that social assistance reduces inequality especially in the
UK, whereas the Italian social assistance scheme does not seem to have much
influence on inequality. If the size of social assistance budgets is taken into
account, the picture changes considerably: The UK does not score that well
anymore, whereas France, Finland and Germany can improve their position. The
inclusion of housing benefits implicates that France does not perform as good
with respect to efficiency in comparison to the results without housing benefits.
This is due to the fact that in France expenditures for housing benefits are much
higher than expenditures for mere social assistance.
When contrasting these findings with the hypotheses on the causes of
redistribution effects, we find that a higher social assistance budget or higher
benefit levels do not necessarily yield a better performance with respect to either
distributive effectiveness or efficiency. Some support is lend to the hypotheses
that targeting enhances distributive efficiency, considering the efficiency figures
of the French system with its fixed-term benefits and moderate degree of
coverage. Concerning centralisation, the results suggest that a medium degree of
centralisation is preferable to any extreme degree of centralisation or
decentralisation from an distributive efficiency perspective.
European Schemes of Social Assistance:
An Empirical Analysis of Set-Ups and Distributive Impacts
Katja Hölsch†1 and Margit Kraus
August 2002
Abstract
This paper analyses the distributive impacts of various
regulatory and institutional settings of European schemes
of social assistance. For this purpose, two sets of
classifications of European schemes of social assistance
are introduced that classify the systems according to
regulatory arrangements and degree of centralisation,
respectively. Subsequently, the distributive impacts of five
selected EU systems are calculated on the basis of LIS
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11 Introduction
The issue of means-tested social assistance has attracted more and more public
attention in recent years. One reason is that the discussion about social
assistance is closely connected to other social security settings because the end
of eligibility for other transfers, such as unemployment benefits, may lead to
eligibility for social assistance. Consequently, if other parts of the transfer
system are not suitably designed or are unable to cope with social problems, the
social assistance system is challenged with them. When recession hit most of the
European countries in the first half of the 1990s, the social security systems
were confronted with increasing unemployment. Accordingly, a rising number
of social assistance recipients was observed in the 1990s in European countries.
In view of the increasing importance of social assistance in the presence of
rising long term unemployment, the question arises how effective social
assistance programs are in achieving their goals of removing inequality, poverty
and insecurity of existence. While discussions have frequently focused on the
possible adverse effects of social assistance schemes for labour supply and
savings behaviour (thus addressing the problem of the economy’s productive
efficiency), the present issue concerns the distributive effectiveness and
efficiency of the social assistance system itself.
Until the seminal contribution of Esping-Anderson (1990), most empirical
work on distributive impacts of social security systems has relied on comparing
the amount of social security expenditures with distributive outcomes. However,
in view of the manifold nature of social assistance regulations, the size of the
social assistance budget alone is unlikely to explain the multifaceted distributive
impacts the systems produce. Consequently, in this paper a multidimensional
approach is adopted that takes into account not only the amount of social
assistance expenditures but also the instruments that are employed to allocate
social assistance payments to their target population as well as the institutional
setting with regard to the systems’ degree of centralisation.
Drawing on previous studies that have examined the relationship between
welfare state settings and distributive outcomes from a more general point of
view, this paper analyses various schemes of social assistance in EU countries
                                                          
 Cf. e.g. EUROSTAT/European Commission 2000.
 Cf. e.g. Puide/Minas 2001: 41f.
 Cf. e.g. Atkinson 1998, Chap. 2.
 See esp. Esping-Anderson 1990, Korpi/Palme 1998 and Castles/Mitchell 1992.
2with respect to their distributive impacts. For this purpose, after defining and
explaining the concept of “distributive efficiency” in section 2, some hypotheses
from socio-economic literature are presented that deal with the relationship
between different social assistance settings, concerning regulatory arrangements
and degrees of centralisation, and their distributive outcomes. Subsequently, in
section 3 we establish two systems of classifications of EU social assistance
schemes. To this end, we invoke two sets of indicators designed to capture the
main characteristics of social assistance schemes concerning their regulatory
arrangements and their degree of centralisation, respectively. In section 4, an
empirical analysis of the impact of social assistance benefits on income
inequality in five selected EU countries is presented, giving both figures of
effectiveness and efficiency calculated from Luxembourg Income Study data on
the basis of various measures of inequality. In section 5, the linkage between the
class assignments of the social assistance schemes established in section 3 and
their distributive impacts is investigated, and the hypotheses presented in section
2 are discussed in the light of these results.
2 Distributive Impacts in Social Assistance Systems
2.1 Assessing Social Transfer Systems: Effectiveness and Efficiency
When discussing the distributive impacts of social transfer systems, analysis is
often limited to measuring the inequality or poverty of post transfer income
distributions. As Castles and Mitchell (1992) have pointed out, this approach
does not measure up to the problem of assessing the effectiveness of social
transfer systems. Rather, the initial, pre-transfer inequality must be taken into
account. Especially when pre-transfer inequalities vary greatly, a mere
comparison of post-transfer inequalities may yield a grossly misleading picture,
as post-transfer inequalities tell nothing about the magnitude by which the initial
inequality has been reduced. Consequently, the appropriate measure for
assessing effectiveness is the percentage reduction of the inequality measure
considered, which is commonly referred to as the redistribution effect.
In interpreting results on distributive effectiveness, it should be taken into
account that the share of social assistance expenditures in GDP varies
substantially between the countries considered. The effectiveness of the systems
                                                          
 Cf. e.g. Gouyette/Pestieau 1999.
3should therefore be judged in the light of the total amount of expenditure spent
in social transfers. For this purpose we introduce a set of measures of
distributive efficiency: Dividing the redistribution effect of the respective
inequality measure by the share of social assistance expenditures in GDP, we
obtain a measure of distributive efficiency that expresses the amount of
redistribution achieved by investing one percent of GDP in social assistance
expenditure.
Analyses of distributive efficiency deal with the question which income
groups are beneficiaries of the social transfers. Distributive efficiency must
therefore be distinguished from administrative efficiency, which deals the
question, which share of the transfers actually reach the recipients, rather than
getting lost in the administrative process. Likewise, distributive efficiency has to
be distinguished from allocative efficiency. In the latter case, adverse effects on
labour supply, savings behaviour and the trade off between equality and
efficiency in general are the main areas of concern. We caution that distributive
efficiency is an efficiency measure in the classical sense of relating outcome
(redistribution) to input (expenditure) and tells nothing about the quality of
social assistance schemes with respect to pareto efficiency or other welfare
economic concepts.
Distributive efficiency may be analysed with respect to reducing either
inequality or poverty. While inequality analyses are concerned with the entire
income distribution, analyses of poverty concentrate on a special part of the
income distribution, namely the fraction of the population with income below
the poverty line. In this paper, research is concentrated on distributive efficiency
in terms of inequality measures, while the issue of poverty reduction is
postponed to a subsequent investigation.
2.2 Causes of Differences in Distributive Impacts: Some Hypotheses
In socio-economic literature, the differences in distributive effectiveness and
efficiency of social transfer systems detected by empirical investigations have
been discussed at length and various arguments have been put forward that deal
with their possible causes. In this paper, we examine two groups of hypotheses,
                                                          
 More specifically, the figure obtained is a measure of average efficiency. Of course, for
issues of interpretation the possibility must be considered that the reduction of inequality
may be subject to increasing marginal costs. 
4that deal with the relationship of the distributive impacts to the regulatory
arrangements and the degree of centralisation of social assistance schemes.
With regard to the regulatory arrangements, several hypotheses concerning
the relation between social assistance scheme settings and distributive outcomes
may be considered. An obvious hypothesis would be that the higher the social
assistance budget and the more generous benefit levels, the more income
inequality could be reduced. On the other hand, higher social assistance budgets
may well achieve a greater extent of redistribution, but it is possible that this
goes at the expense of declining distributive efficiency. It thus seems reasonable
to examine the relationship between the size of the social assistance budget as
well as the level of social assistance benefits and the effectiveness and efficiency
of income redistribution. Additionally, it has been argued that in the presence of
limited budgets, targeted benefits can enhance distributive efficiency as
payments are better directed to those in need. While means tests are a common
measure of targeting in all European social assistance schemes, systems differ
with respect to other targeting measures such as the fraction of the population
eligible for benefits and the time-span for which benefits are warranted.
Consequently, from the viewpoint of the targeting argument it may be
hypothesised that more targeted systems may achieve higher figures of
distributive efficiency.
Concerning the issue of centralised versus decentralised systems, it is
frequently argued that decentralised decisions on social security programs
encourage migration flows of social security beneficiaries towards regions with
more generous benefits, thus overburdening these regions' fiscal budgets. As a
consequence, the degree of redistribution is reduced to a sub-optimal level when
judged from a welfare theoretical perspective. This leads to the hypothesis that
more centralised systems are more effective with regards to redistribution.
Conversely, as an argument in favour of decentralizing distributive politics, the
point has been made that more decentralised systems are better informed about
the neediness of the beneficiaries and should therefore be more efficient in
allocating benefits to the recipients.	

                                                          
 Cf. e.g. Cuyler 1980, Tullock 1997.
	 vgl. z.B. Wildasin 1991, Sinn 1995.

 See Schwager 1997.
53 Classifying Schemes of Social Assistance 
3.1 Cluster Analysis as a Method for Classification
To examine how European schemes of social assistance differ with respect to
the above mentioned characteristics, we attempt to classify these systems into
several groups according to their regulatory arrangements and degree of
centralisation, respectively. In socio-economic literature, several attempts have
been made to classify welfare states in general,		 but to our knowledge no study
has focused on the differences and common features of social assistance
schemes specifically. Moreover, in establishing classifications of welfare
systems, quantitative methods have rarely been employed. This is mainly due to
the fact that statistical inference is impeded by the small number of observations
that do not permit any sensible regression analysis. Instead, several heuristic and
semi-quantitative investigations have been conducted. However, with all purely
qualitative assessments there is the danger of misjudging class assignments by
overvaluing highly conspicuous features on the cost of neglecting the less
obtrusive traits. A quantitative analysis of class assignments is therefore highly
desirable. 
As Kangas (1994) has noted, cluster analysis may be the method of choice to
determine class assignments in cases where regression analysis must be ruled
out for lack of observations. Cluster analysis is a descriptive instrument of
explorative data analysis designed to identify "natural groupings" of cases by
simultaneously comparing multiple characteristics depicted by a set of input
variables.	 To this end, measures of distances for the values of the input
variables are computed. Subsequently, grouping algorithms are employed to
classify the cases into groups. As cluster analysis is a tool of descriptive
statistics, sources of error and variation are not formally considered. To check
for the stability of the results, various clustering methods based on different
distance measures and grouping algorithms should be conducted. 
The results of hierarchical cluster analyses can be graphically displayed by
so-called dendrograms.	 In those tree diagrams, the clusters are represented by
branches that merge together when junctions of clusters occur. The positions of
these mergers along the distance axis indicate the level of the aggregate distance
                                                          


 Cf. e.g. Esping-Anderson 1990, Korpi/Palme 1998, Castles/Mitchell 1992, Kangas 1994.

 Cf. e.g. Johnson/Wichern 1998.

 Cf. Johnson/Wichern 1998.
6measure at which the cases are grouped together: Mergers close to the left-hand
side of the diagram indicate that the respective countries are very similar,
whereas mergers close to the right point to considerable dissimilarities.
Accordingly, with respect to the case list on the left hand side of the diagram
cases are listed according to their similarity: Countries exhibiting very similar
characteristics are listed close to each other, whereas more differing countries
are listed further apart. Consequently, from the successive junctions of the
branches, groupings and sub-groupings exhibiting different levels of
homogeneity may be identified.
To form the basis for an empirical investigation of the above mentioned
hypotheses, we develop two systems of indicators suitable for classifying social
assistance schemes according to their regulatory arrangements and their degree
of centralisation. These indicators are subsequently employed as input variables
for different methods of cluster analysis in order to establish classifications for
regulatory arrangements and degree of centralisation of social assistance
schemes.
3.2 Classifying According to Regulatory Arrangements 
To develop a system of indicators for social assistance schemes according to
their arrangements, the major social assistance regulations as well as data on
social assistance expenditures were examined. For the reporting year, for
reasons of data availability with respect to the complementary empirical
investigation presented in section 4, the year 1995 has been chosen. In 1995, in
all EU13 countries social assistance was found to be tax funded and granted on
the basis of means tests only. Apart from significant differences in the amount of
social assistance budgets, the main differences were found with respect to the
degree of coverage, the time period for which benefits are granted and the level
of benefits compared to median equivalent income.	 Keeping the above
mentioned hypotheses in mind, the following indicators were chosen to
represent the main differences in regulatory arrangements:	
                                                          

 Data on median equivalent income were taken from EUROSTAT 1999 and refer to the
year 1995.

 Details on the variables and indicators employed are given in Appendix A. Data on
regulatory arrangements are taken from MISSOC 1995, data on social assistance
expenditures stem from Gough et al 1997.
71. With regard to the level of social assistance system the share of social
assistance expenditures in GDP and an indicator for the generosity of
social assistance benefits.
2. With regard to targeting an indicator for the degree of coverage and an
indicator for time period for which the benefits are granted.
As different scales of measurement may greatly affect the results of cluster
analyses, all variables were normalised to the range of [0;1].	 To check for the
stability of our results, Ward Linkage, Median Linkage and Average Linkage
with quadratic Euclidean distances as well as Average Linkage with
Minkowski(1) distances has been run. The results of our calculations are shown
in the following dendrograms:
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
    C A S E      0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label     Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL          4   
  P          10                                                  
  DK          2                              
  UK         13                                             
  FIN        11                                                 
  SE         12                    
  A          14                     
  B           1           
  IRL         7                    
  NL          9            
  D           3              
  F           6      
  I           8        
  E           5   
Figure 1a: Dendrogram, Average Linkage, Quadratic Euclidean Distance
                                                          

 As the Ward algorithm is based on the presence of differences in variances, which are
cancelled out by the more common z-transformation, the [0;1]-transformation is preferred.
8Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
    C A S E      0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label     Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL          4   
  P          10                                                  
  F           6                                  
  I           8                             
  E           5                                 
  IRL         7                                       
  NL          9                       
  FIN        11               
  SE         12                       
  A          14               
  B           1              
  D           3                
  DK          2   
  UK         13   
Figure 1b: Dendrogram, Average Linkage, Minkowski(1) Distance
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
    C A S E      0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label     Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL          4   
  P          10                
  F           6                                               
  I           8                                     
  E           5                                                
  DK          2                                        
  UK         13                                                 
  FIN        11            
  SE         12          
  A          14           
  B           1    
  IRL         7    
  NL          9   
  D           3   
Figure 1c: Dendrogram, Ward Linkage, Quadratic Euclidean Distance
9Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
    C A S E      0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label     Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  EL          4   
  P          10                
  E           5                                    
  DK          2                            
  UK         13                                           
  FIN        11                                                 
  SE         12                      
  A          14                       
  B           1                
  IRL         7                      
  NL          9        
  D           3        
  F           6   
  I           8   
Figure 1d:  Dendrogram, Median Linkage, Quadratic Euclidian Distance
From these dendrograms, we can see that apart from Greece and Portugal, where
no nation wide social assistance scheme existed in 1995, with respect to
regulatory arrangements we may distinguish two distinctly different groups:	
 The first group consists of Spain, France and Italy. In these countries, a
general scheme of social assistance existed but it was regionally
fragmented and benefits were granted for limited time periods only.
 The second group comprises Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany,
Finland, Sweden, Austria, Denmark and the UK. In all of these countries a
universal system of social assistance existed and benefits were granted for
an indefinite period. Within this group, Denmark and the UK are separated
from the remaining countries due to their distinctly higher degree of
coverage and social assistance budgets.
As the diagrams show, these classifications prove stable with all clustering
methods except for Median linkage, where France and Italy are split from the
first group and added as an additional subgroup to the second major group.
                                                          

 It should be noted that in Portugal a general system of social assistance has been
introduced in 1996.
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3.3 Classifying According to Centralisation Degrees
To develop a system of indicators suitable to capture the degree of
centralisation, the administrative settings, regulations concerning funding
liabilities and decision responsibilities were investigated. The main differences
were found to relate to the funding shares of the various federal levels, the
assignment of formal decision competence and the degree of uniformity of
benefit levels over the nation state. Accordingly, as input variables for cluster
analysis, an indicator for funding liability, an indicator for formal decision
responsibility and an indicator for regional differences in benefit levels were
employed.	 Again all variables were normalised to the range of [0;1]. Running
the above mentioned four different methods of cluster analysis we obtained the
dendrograms shown in figure 2a to 2d:
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
  C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  IR      10   
  UK      14   
  NL      11    
  DK       4    
  F        7         
  B        2        
  FI       8          
  E        5                                               
  I        9                                                
  D        3                                          
  SE      13                                                 
  A        1                                                
  EL       6   
  P       12   
Figure 2a: Dendrogram, Average Linkage, Quadratic Euclidian Distance
                                                          

 Details on the variables and indicators employed here are given in Appendix B. Data for
these indicators are taken from MISSOC 1995. We note that administrative responsibility
is assigned to the local level in all countries investigated and has therefore not been taken
into account for the purpose of indicator construction.
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Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
  C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  IR      10   
  UK      14   
  NL      11        
  DK       4        
  F        7                 
  B        2               
  FI       8                                               
  D        3                                       
  SE      13                                       
  E        5                                         
  I        9                                             
  A        1                                          
  EL       6   
  P       12   
Figure 2b: Dendrogram, Average Linkage, Minkowski(1) Distance
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
  C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  IR      10   
  UK      14   
  NL      11    
  DK       4    
  F        7               
  B        2              
  FI       8                                                 
  D        3                                                 
  SE      13                                    
  E        5                                                  
  I        9                                                  
  A        1                                                  
  EL       6   
  P       12   
Figure 2c: Dendrogramm, Ward Method, Quadratic Euclidian Distance
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Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
  C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  IR      10   
  UK      14   
  NL      11    
  DK       4    
  F        7         
  B        2        
  FI       8          
  E        5                                               
  I        9                                                
  D        3                                          
  SE      13                                                 
  A        1                                                
  EL       6   
  P       12   
Figure 2d: Dendrogramm, Median Linkage, Quadratic Euclidian Distance
As the dendrograms show, with respect to their degree of centralisation we may
distinguish three broad categories of systems (apart from Greece and Portugal,
where no nation wide system of social assistance existed in the reporting year
1995):
 The first group showing a comparatively high degree of decentralisation
comprises Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy and Austria. In these countries,
benefits are funded by municipalities, benefit levels are established by
regional or local authorities and vary across regions.
 In the second group, we find Belgium, Denmark, France and Finland. In these
countries, benefit levels are set by the central government and are largely
uniform across regions. Funding, however, is provided by regional or local
authorities.
 The third group, which features the highest degree of centralisation, consists
of Ireland, the United Kingdom, closely followed by the Netherlands. In these
countries, benefit levels are established by the central government and are
completely uniform across regions. In addition, benefits are funded (almost)
completely by the central state.
13
As with the analysis of regulatory arrangements, apart from a few minor
changes of position within the first group, the obtained classifications prove
valid for all clustering methods employed. 
The two classifications obtained with respect to regulatory arrangements and
degree of centralisation thus yield fairly different groupings of countries. In the
following section, an analysis of distributive impacts in selected countries
classified into different groups is presented to gain some insight as to which
aspect might be more important in regards to redistribution and distributive
efficiency.
4 Distributive Impacts of Social Assistance Payments: 
Empirical Analysis
4.1 Methodological issues
In this section, the impact of social assistance benefits on income inequality in
selected European countries exhibiting different characteristics with regard to
regulatory arrangements and degrees of centralisation is investigated on the
basis of Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data. The LIS database is a collection
of household income surveys that are harmonized in order to enable comparative
studies for different countries.	 For the reporting years of 1994/95 usable data
sets are available for Italy, Germany, France, Finland and the United
Kingdom.
 
As units of analysis, households have been selected. The relevant definition
for disposable income (dpi) used here is the yearly disposable income as defined
by LIS,	 net of pensions. We use the concept of equivalent household income
here which makes it possible to compare households of different sizes:
Equivalent household income is obtained by dividing household income through
the equivalent number of household members which is calculated applying an
                                                          

	 For more information on the LIS data see http://www.lisproject.org and e.g. Smeeding
2002.
 For closer information on the arrangements concerning social assistance in these countries
see e.g. Weber/Leienbach 2000.

 See for definition of disposable income http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc/summary.pdf. 
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equivalence scale. By means of this concept, the presence of economies of
scale due to fixed costs in household consumption is taken into account.
It has been well known in income inequality analyses that different measures
of income inequality assess a given income redistribution differently. For
instance, it has been noted by Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973) that the Gini
coefficient is most sensitive to changes in the middle ranges of the income
distribution. By contrast, the Atkinson measure for ε=1 (subsequently referred to
as A1) reacts most sensitively to changes in the lower ranges of income
distributions. To obtain a reasonable picture of the distributive impacts, three
measures of inequality have been invoked: The Gini coefficient, A1 and the
income share ratio S80/S20, giving the ratio of the income share of the 20%
richest to the income share of the 20% poorest in total income. S80/S20 only
registers changes affecting the top and bottom quintile but does not react to
changes in the medium range of the income distribution. The Gini coefficient
and A1 both have a lower limit of zero, which applies if income is equally
distributed. Higher values for these measures indicate a higher level of
inequality with a maximum value of unity. For S80/S20 a minimum value of
unity (income equality) and no natural upper limit applies.
In most countries, social assistance payments are supplemented by payments
of housing benefits. As housing costs vary greatly between countries, to
complete the picture, distributive impacts for social assistance plus housing
benefits were also calculated and compared to the results obtained for social
assistance payments alone.
To take differences in social assistance budgets into account, apart from the
redistribution effect as a measure of effectiveness, the corresponding figures for
distributive efficiency as defined in section 2.1 are calculated. Unfortunately,
reliable data on social assistance expenditures suitable for inter-country
comparisons are unavailable for the reporting year of 1995. Accordingly, data
                                                          
 The equivalence scale employed here is the square root of the household size. Cf. e.g.
Biewen 2000: 3f, Atkinson/Rainwater/Smeeding 1995: 18ff for further information on
equivalence scales.
 A1 is a special case of the family of Atkinson measures. The sensitivity of these measures
depends on the parameter ε, ε = 1 indicates a sensitivity in the lower parts of the income
distribution. Additional technical details on the measures employed are given in Appendix
C. Cf. also e.g. Atkinson 1970, Hauser 1999: 92, Cowell 1995: 137 ff.
 Effectiveness and efficiency figures have been calculated on the basis of a number of
further measures of inequality, but no distinctively different patterns have been found. 
 S80/S20 as applied by EUROSTAT, see e.g. EUROSTAT 1998.
 Data provided by regularly published EUROSTAT statistics do not include the category of
social assistance as defined by MISSOC, but only a subcategory named „social exclusion“
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provided by Gough et al. (1997) referring to the reporting year of 1992 had to be
employed. Consequently, we caution that the efficiency figures calculated are
not to be taken as an exact measure of distributive efficiency but rather as an
indicator variable that points to the relative efficiency of the social assistance
schemes considered.
4.2 Results on Distributive Effectiveness and Efficiency
To investigate the distributive impacts of social assistance, the three inequality
measures mentioned have been calculated for disposable income and disposable
income less social assistance for each country. In order to compare the effects of
social assistance in the different countries, the percentage reduction of the values
of the applied measures for disposable income less social assistance to
disposable income have been computed. The results obtained are shown in
figure 3.a to 3.c:
Figure 3a: Percentage reduction A1 Figure 3b: Percentage reduction S80/S20
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which is not congruent with the notion of social assistance used here. In MISSOC, by
contrast, data on social expenditure are unavailable for Italy, while for some of the
remaining countries only estimates referring to different reporting years are provided.
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Figure 3c: Percentage reduction Gini coefficient
The diagrams clearly show that the impact of social assistance payments on
income inequality differs considerably between countries: While in the UK
social assistance has a strong impact on inequality with very high effectiveness
figures, in Italy almost no effect is visible. Considering the rank position for the
countries, the results for the remaining countries depend on the measure
employed. For effectiveness with respect to A1 or S80/S20, the UK shows the
highest reduction of income inequality, followed by Germany, while Finland
and France have still lower percentage reductions. By contrast, when calculating
effectiveness on the basis of the Gini coefficient, Finland takes the second
position, followed by Germany and France.
The results presented so far take only account of the percentage reduction of
income inequality after social assistance. They neglect the fact that this
reduction of inequality is obtained at different expenditure levels for this
transfer. Shifting the focus from effectiveness to efficiency, the distributive
efficiency of social assistance has been calculated by means of dividing the
percentage reduction as defined above by the share of social assistance
expenditures in GDP. Employing the effectiveness figures for the three
inequality measures in questions for the numerator, we obtain the results
displayed in figure 4.a to 4.c:
                                                          
 As noted above, as suitable data on social assistance expenditures are unavailable for the
reporting year of 1995, the data provided by Gough et al (1997) referring to the reporting
year of 1992 had to be employed. Specifically, the data provided under the category [1]:
General Assistance in Gough et al. (1997) were employed for calculations on social
assistance alone. For calculations including housing benefits expenditures listed in
category [3]: Housing Assistance were added. Cf. Gough et al 1997: 25.
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Figure 4a: Efficiency values A1 Figure 4b: Efficiency values S80/S20
Figure 4c: Efficiency values Gini coefficient
As the diagrams show, when the size of the social assistance budget is taken into
account, the picture changes considerably with regard to the rank positions of
the countries. The only exception is Italy, who cannot compensate for her weak
effectiveness results by her low expenditure level. The performance of the four
remaining countries again depends on the inequality measure applied.
For efficiency with respect to A1 France (who took the third position with
respect to effectiveness) achieves the highest figure, which is due to her
comparatively low social assistance budget. She is followed by Germany (who
thus holds the same rank position as for effectiveness) and Finland (who with
regard to effectiveness was at the next to last position). Interestingly, the UK,
whose effectiveness figures were the highest with all three measures of
inequality, does not perform that convincing when evaluated from an efficiency
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perspective: The efficiency indicator on the basis of A1 places her at the next to
last position only.
When calculating efficiency figures with respect to S80/S20, France again
achieves the highest figures, this time improving from the next to last position
when compared with effectiveness. The Finnish social assistance system seems
to be more efficient than both the British and the German system, which for
effectiveness had the top positions.
Calculations based on the Gini coefficient again yield somewhat different
results. This time the Finish social assistance scheme is indicated to perform
more efficiently than the French, albeit the difference is very small. Germany
takes the third position (which she also took with respect to effectiveness),
followed by the UK (who clearly had the top position for effectiveness figures).
To summarise, it is clear from the results just discussed that when taking the
size of the social assistance budget into account, the distributive impacts yield a
very different picture. In particular, considering the UK, the impressive results
with respect to effectiveness cannot compensate for the comparatively high
expenditure figures this system takes up. By contrast, the French and Finish
systems with lower expenditures improve their positions when compared to the
calculations for effectiveness, while Germany holds its position for A1 and the
Gini coefficient. Considering Italy, the opposite reasoning than for the UK
applies: Although effectiveness results are weak, the low level of social
expenditure cannot compensate for the poor results in effectiveness.
It is interesting to compare these results with the calculations carried out for
social assistance plus housing benefits.. The results are shown in direct
comparison in table 1 and 2:
                                                          
 That means that the effectiveness and efficiency figures are calculated on the basis of
disposable income less the sum of social assistance and housing benefits and the
expenditure figures for social assistance and housing benefits as indicated in table 2.
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France Italy Germany UK Finland
A1
dpi – social
assistance
14.60 1.70 28.44 39.11 10.92
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing benefits)
26.54 - 42.94 64.44 17.58
S80/S20
dpi – social
assistance
6.57 1.61 8.18 45.08 7.67
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing benefits)
19.12 - 11.78 79.83 14.44
Gini coefficient
dpi – social
assistance
1.49 0.50 2.46 10.55 3.14
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing benefits)
5.33 - 3.49 17.36 5.96
Table 1: Effectiveness measures for social assistance and housing benefits
dpi: disposable income
France Italy Germany UK Finland
A1
dpi – social
assistance
73.00 8.50 56.88 15.64 27.3
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing benefits)
26.54 - 61.34 17.42 -
S80/S20
dpi – social
assistance
32.85 8.05 16.36 18.03 19.18
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing benefits)
19.12 - 16.83 21.58 -
Gini coefficient
dpi – social
assistance
7.45 2.50 4.92 4.22 7.85
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing benefits)
5.33 - 4.99 4.69 -
Table 2: Efficiency measures for social assistance and housing benefits
dpi: disposable income
                                                          
	 The variable including housing benefits is not available for Italy in the LIS dataset. Only a
few Italian regions provide specific housing benefits mainly for elderly people.
 Expenditures for housing benefits are not available for Finland in Gough et al 1997.
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Since an additional transfer is included in the present calculations, it is to be
expected that effectiveness figures are generally higher. Considering the rank
order of the countries, the only difference between the cases with and without
housing benefits concerns the results obtained for the Gini coefficient and
S80/S20, for which France and Germany switch positions. This is probably due
to the fact that in France 8.8 % of population receive housing benefits and 1.1 %
social assistance whereas in Germany 2.8 % are recipients of housing benefits
and 4.5 % receive social assistance.	
With regard to efficiency, data on expenditures for housing benefits are not
available for Finland. If they were available and included, it is likely that the
ranking would be a little bit different. Considering the efficiency calculated on
the basis of the Gini coefficient only, rank positions remain unchanged. By
contrast, with respect to A1 and S80/S20 considerable changes take place. For
efficiency numbers for A1, Germany, who was ranked second best before
housing benefits, switches positions with France and is now at the top position.
This high efficiency performance of Germany may be explained by the low
additional cost for housing assistance, especially in comparison to France,
whose expenditures for housing assistance are four times as high as the costs for
social assistance alone. In the UK, the expenditures for housing benefits are
higher than even the French costs for social assistance and housing benefits
taken together. As a result, these two countries rank lower from an efficiency
perspective compared to their position with regard to effectiveness.
The effectiveness and efficiency indicators based on A1 seem to be
particularly important when considering social assistance because of its high
sensitivity in the lower parts of the income distribution which contains the
primary target group for social assistance payments. The Gini coefficient, on the
other hand, places the highest weight on the middle range of the income
distribution. Despite its popularity, it may thus not be the most desirable
standard in evaluations of social assistance schemes. In comparison to S80/S20,
we wish to point out that calculations of A1 are based on the entire income
distribution. A1 thus takes into account for the possibility that social assistance
benefits may also be targeted on part of the second income quintile and registers
changes in inequality achieved by improving the income situation of this group,
which is not true for S80/S20. In the presence of ambiguous rank orders for the
countries when applying different measures of inequality these considerations
should be taken into account.
                                                          

 Cf. Eardley et al 1996.
21
5 Distributive Impacts and Class Assignments: An Evaluation
The results just presented offer some interesting evidence with respect to the
hypotheses on causes of differences in distributive performance as discussed in
section 2. To begin with, concerning regulatory arrangements the principle “the
more, the better” does not seem to hold generally. With regard to effectiveness,
the UK with her exceptionally high social assistance budget admittedly scores
unambiguously higher than the other countries investigated. However, for
France, Finland and Germany no clear-cut connection between either the extent
of the social assistance budget or the level of benefits can be found. While Italy
is ranked last with regard to effectiveness figures, her social assistance budget is
about the same size as France’s, who is ranked at the third best position when
judged by A1. Likewise, when considering the benefit level, again the UK with
the highest benefit levels is ranked best and Italy with the lowest level is ranked
last, but for the remaining countries, no unambiguous connection between
benefit level and distributive effectiveness shows up. The Finish scheme with its
much lower benefit levels is even ranked before the comparatively high level
German system when judged by the Gini coefficient. 
When considering distributive efficiency, the connection between social
assistance budget and/or benefit levels and distributive outcomes completely
dissolves: The French fixed-term scheme despite its comparatively low level of
benefits and coverage proves distinctly more efficient when compared to either
the encompassing but expensive UK system, the middle range German system
or the fragmented and low-level Italian system. The results thus lend some
support to the hypothesis that targeting, in this case in the sense of granting
benefits for a limited period only, enhances the efficiency of social transfer
schemes.
With respect to the degree of centralisation, again there is no support for the
hypothesis that the more centralised a system, the more effective redistribution
will be. Apart from the extreme cases of Italy and the UK, the results on
effectiveness do not show any clear-cut connection between the degree of
centralisation and distributive effectiveness. Taking the previous arguments into
account, the effectiveness figures of Italy and the UK seem to be spurred by the
high degree of fragmentation of the Italian and the exceptionally high budget of
the British scheme, rather than by different degrees of centralisation. The mixed
results on effectiveness in connection to centralisation degrees for the remaining
countries point to the same conclusion. Considering distributive efficiency, there
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is no evidence that more decentralised systems are more efficient in
redistribution. Considering that France, Finland and Germany are ranked higher
than either the extremely centralised British and the highly decentralised Italian
system, some support is lend to the reasoning that from an efficiency
perspective, a medium degree of centralisation is preferable to any extreme
centralisation degrees. 
6 Conclusion
In this paper, the linkage between social assistance schemes, centralisation,
inequality and efficiency in Europe has been examined. After stating some
hypotheses on the causes of redistribution effects, classifications of European
social assistance schemes according to regulatory arrangements and
centralisation were developed. Subsequently, an empirical analysis of the
distributive effectiveness and efficiency of five selected schemes of social
assistance was carried out.
The results suggest that social assistance reduces inequality especially in the
UK, whereas the Italian social assistance scheme does not seem to have much
influence on inequality. If the size of social assistance budgets is taken into
account, the picture changes considerably: The UK does not score that well
anymore, whereas France, Finland and Germany can improve their position. The
inclusion of housing benefits implicates that France does not perform as good
with respect to efficiency in comparison to the results without housing benefits.
This is due to the fact that in France expenditures for housing benefits are much
higher than expenditures for mere social assistance.
When contrasting these findings with the hypotheses on the causes of
redistribution effects, we find that a higher social assistance budget or higher
benefit levels do not necessarily yield a better performance with respect to either
distributive effectiveness or efficiency. Some support is lend to the hypotheses
that targeting enhances distributive efficiency, considering the efficiency figures
of the French system with its fixed-term benefits and moderate degree of
coverage. Concerning centralisation, the results suggest that a medium degree of
centralisation is preferable to any extreme degrees of decentralisation or
centralisation from a distributive efficiency perspective.
We wish to emphasize that social security benefits are not designed solely to
reduce inequality. When additional important objectives, such as reducing
23
poverty and social exclusion, are considered, results may yield a different
picture. To enhance the information on effectiveness and efficiency of social
assistance schemes, further investigations including these aspects are therefore
highly desirable.
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Appendix A: Indicators for Classification According to
Regulatory Arrangements
The following indicators were used as input variables for the cluster analyses
concerning regulatory arrangements:
Level of social assistance system:
1. The share of social assistance expenditures in GDP:
This variable was introduced to capture the total effort invested in social
assistance. As data suitable for inter-country comparisons are unavailable
for the reporting year 1995, data provided by Gough et al (1997), referring
to the reporting year 1992 had to be used.
2. An indicator for the generosity of social assistance benefits:
This variable captures the level of benefits as intended by the social
assistance directive. The indicator was calculated using the ratio of social
assistance benefits to the median income both for a single adult (MIA).
Data on the level of social assistance benefits are given in
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (1996) and report total monthly
benefits including additional allowances in 01/01/1995. Data on MIA for
all countries with the exception of Finland and Sweden are given in
EUROSTAT (1999) and refer to the reporting year 1994. As data on MIA
were unavailable for Finland and Sweden, they were estimated as 60% of
per capita income in 1994. The 60% ratio was chosen on the basis of an
evaluation of the ratio of MIA to per capita income for all countries where
data were available and a comparison of inequality figures in these
countries given in LIS keyfigures. In this comparison for all countries
with comparable figures for income inquality, the MIA to per capita
income was found to be in the range of 0.58 to 0.63. All data have been
extrapolated to 1995 using the GDP the growth rate. 
Degree of targeting:
3. An indicator for the degree of coverage:
The indicator for the degree of coverage intends to the degree to which the
social assistance safety net applies for the entire population equally. It is
constructed from information on the fraction of population eligible for
social assistance benefits and the degree to which benefit levels differ
regionally. For the indicator for fraction of population eligible for benefits
(I1) eligibility conditions were evaluated with respect to age limits and
conditions concerning ability and readiness to work. According to the
restrictions imposed on eligibility, countries were assigned integer values 1
                                                          
 See http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm
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to 10. For the construction of the indicator for regional differentiation (I2)
see App. B. The overall coverage indicator was calculated according to the
formula I=(I1 + I2)/2.
4. An indicator for time period for which the benefits are granted:
This indicator is invoked to account for the fact that in some countries
social assistance benefits are not granted for an unlimited time period. Data
on benefit duration are given in MISSOC (1995). Countries were classified
into five categories and assigned the integer values 1 to 3, depending on
whether there was no nation-wide system at all (1), benefit duration was
limited (2) or unlimited (3). 
The values of the indicator variables, normalised to [0,1], are given in the table
below. Countries are listed in descending order.
Share of Soc.
Ass. Exp.in GDP
Indicator for
Benefit Levels
Indicator for
Degree of
Coverage
Indicator for
Benefit Duration
UK 1.00 D 1.00 D 1.00 B 1.00
DK 0.56 I 0.95 I 0.95 DK 1.00
NL 0.32 B 0.86 A 0.88 D 1.00
D 0.20 DK 0.86 B 0.85 IRL 1.00
SE 0.20 UK 0.86 DK 0.85 NL 1.00
FIN 0.16 FIN 0.80 UK 0.85 FIN 1.00
IRL 0.12 SE 0.80 FIN 0.80 SE 1.00
F 0.08 F 0.74 SE 0.80 UK 1.00
I 0.08 IRL 0.74 IRL 0.74 A 1.00
B 0.04 NL 0.74 NL 0.74 E 0.50
A 0.04 E 0.44 F 0.68 F 0.50
E 0.01 A 0.43 E 0.44 I 0.50
EL 0.00 EL 0.00 EL 0.00 EL 0.00
P 0.00 P 0.00 P 0.00 P 0.00
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Appendix B: Indicators for Classification According to Degree of
Centralisation
The following indicators were used as input variables for the cluster analyses
concerning the degree of centralisation:
1. An indicator for funding liability:
This indicator captures the degree to which social assistance expenditures
are financed by the central government, by regional authorities/federal state
or by local authorities. For this purpose, three partial indicators were
constructed that recorded the percentage to which expenditures were
funded by the central government (I1), by regional authorities/federal states
(I2) or by local authorities (I3). The overall indicator I was calculated
according to the formula I=(3*I1 + 2*I2 + I3)/6.
2. An indicator for formal decision responsibility: 
This indicator reflects the federal level (central government, federal states
or regional authorities, local authorities) at which basic-rate benefits are
established. Using information from MISSOC (1995), countries were
classified into five categories and assigned the integer values 1 to 5,
depending on whether there was no nation wide system at all (1) or regular
benefit levels were established by local authorities (2), regional authorities
or federal states (3), local or regional authorities were bounded through
nation-wide coordination (4) or benefit levels were established by the
central government (5).
3. An indicator for regional differences in benefit levels: 
This indicator captures the degree to which benefit levels actually vary
between regions. Data on the percentage variation are given in MISSOC
(1995) for all countries with the exception of Finland and Sweden, where
benefit levels differ regionally according to costs of living. As no estimates
for the amount of this variation was obtainable, a sensitivity for the cluster
analyses was carried out, in which the classifications obtained proved
stable for an indicator range of 0,76 to 1,00 for these two countries.
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The values of the indicator variables, normalised to [0,1], are given in the table
below. Countries are listed in descending order.
indicator for
funding liability
indicator for
formal decision
resonsibility
indicator for
regional
differences in
benefit levels 
IR 1,00 B 1,00 B 1,00
UK 1,00 DK 1,00 DK 1,00
NL 0,93 F 1,00 F 1,00
B 0,67 FI 1,00 IR 1,00
DK 0,67 IR 1,00 NL 1,00
F 0,67 NL 1,00 UK 1,00
A 0,65 UK 1,00 D 0,95
FI 0,61 D 0,75 FI 0,76-1,00
D 0,42 SE 0,75 SE 0,76-1,00
E 0,33 A 0,50 I 0,85
I 0,33 E 0,50 E 0,75
SE 0,33 I 0,50 A 0,70
EL 0,00 EL 0,00 EL 0,00
P 0,00 P 0,00 P 0,00
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Appendix C: Inequality Measures
With
n number of households considered
yi income of i-th household
µ arithmetic mean of income,
the Gini coefficient is defined as
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The Gini coefficient can take on values in [0,1], where the lower bound of 0
applies in the case when all incomes are equal. It is most easily understood as
the average distance between all possible pairs of incomes in the population,
divided by total income. As the second part of the above definition shows,
changes in inequality only depend on the rank order the affected households take
in the income distribution but not on the amount by which their incomes differ.
Accordingly, as income distributions are most densely ranked in the lower
middle realm, the Gini coefficient reacts very sensitively to changes in this part
of the income distribution but considerably less if changes occur in the upper or
lower realms.
The family of Atkinson measures is defined as
This family of measures has been constructed by Atkinson (1970) under explicit
consideration of welfare aspects. The parameter  is commonly referred to as the
“inequality aversion parameter”, its magnitude determines the weight assigned
to downward deviations from the mean income. The higher the value of , the
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higher the importance attributed to income deviations. With =0, society is
indifferent about the income distribution, whereas with  society is
concerned only with the lowest income group. The Atkinson measure can take
on values in [0,1], where again a value of 0 applies if income is distributed
equally. The figure calculated at a given value of  may be interpreted as “the
proportion of present total income that would be required to achieve the same
level of social welfare as at present if incomes were equally distributed”. E.g. a
value of A1=0.2 would imply that at given , if distributed equally only 80% of
present total income would suffice to achieve the same welfare level. The
measure applied in this investigation is the Atkinson measure for 1 , which
indicates a moderate sensitivity in the lower parts of the income distribution.
The income share ratio S80/S20 is defined as 
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where
m1 household at quintile 1
m4 household at quintile 4
S80/S20 is a measure commonly used in investigations on income inequality
published by EUROSTAT and other statistical institutions. Albeit intuitive, it
has the obvious disadvantage that it only registers income transfers that cause a
change in the total income of the 20% poorest or the 20% richest in the income
distribution. No transfers occurring within these groups or in the middle range of
the income distribution are registered. Moreover, all transfers registered are
assigned equal weight.
                                                          
 Cf. Atkinson 1975: 48 f.
 Atkinson 1975: 48.
